Facts are not facts by Glastra van Loon, J.F. (Jan)
I. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 
Facts are nGt Facts 
..I. IF. Gaastra van Loon 
Working Paper. The opinions expressed in this 
paper are those of the author and not necessarily 
those of the Institute of Social Studies. 
Occasional Paper No. 35. March 1973. 
Institute of Social Studies 
THE HAGUE -NETHERLANDS 

FACT ARE NOT FACTS 
J.F. Glastra van Loon 
MY point of departure in this article is a conception of,science which 
on various points differs essentially from positivism. Firstly, I 
believe that every conception of science inherently implies a concep-
tion of man. Secondly, I do not -regard the acquisition of knowledge 
as the mere receipt, registration and classification of data and the 
consequent determination of conformities, regularities, ,etc., in the 
empirical data thus processed. Thirdly, I do not accept the notion that 
a sharp dividing line exists between fact and norm. Having saidthis, 
I hasten to add that neither do I accept a'naturallaw doctrine, 
rationalistic or otherwise. In my view, an essential characteristic 
of scientific practice is to test theses not only on their mutual'com-
patibility or consistency but also on their empirical tenability •. The 
question is, however, what is understood by experience and by test-
ing? 
This cannot be answered without an appeal to a particular con-
ception of man. A natural law theory coincides in its quintessence 
with such a concept and explicitly brings it to the fore. Positivism 
not only denies having any concept of man as a point of 'departure but 
emphatically rejects the idea that ,science may be founded in any way 
on a concept of man. Concepts of man are relegated by the positivists 
to the realm of subjective fables; a sphere which man may furnish 
with the products of his will, his desires, and his imagination: this 
ability to develop philosphy and a.concept of man should be sharply 
separated from the objective cognition of reality. Philosophies of 
man are designed by man and derive from his own activity; they are 
subjective and of no more significance than is given them by man, 
voluntarily or otherwise. Knowledge, on the other hand,is the conscious-
ness, determined by reality, of what things actually are, objectively 
valid and valid for everyone, that is, of universal validity. That is 
the position taken by the positivists. 
According to positi~ism, science is only incidentally concerned 
with individual empirical subjects of cognition. The latter may be 
indispensable and 'responsible for a historic state of science, but 
scientific validity is determined by a criterion which is independent 
of such empirical and historical subjects: science is truth about 
facts. Individuals. participate in that truth, out they can be substituted 
and interchanged. Science cannot exist without people but it has its own 
validity , it is an established truth ,independent of all those things that 
~ake man a particular individual: his empirical, cultural, historical make-
up, his wishes and cravings, his activities, his particular viewpoints and 
opinions. 
The implications of this conception of science 'have been farthest 
pursued by Immanuel Kant. Acce'pting the assumed factual existence of scien-
ce (as valid knowledge), he queries the conditions for its feasibility. In 
my view this is tantamount to analysing the (tacitly accepted) assumptions 
regarding man on which this conception of science is based. In other words, 
nCiv should we see man in relationship to reality if objectively and univer-
sally valid cognition of reality is to be possible? ' 
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Kant's analysis terminates in a speoifioation of· neoessary oonditions 
of knowledge. These hp. oalled AnsohauungsfQrmen of peroeption: and l±inking 
oategories of reason. 1 These oonditions of the possibility of soienceas 
valid knowledge are neither empirioally reoognisable nor faotual in the 
sense and manner in whioh objects of knowledge exist and are reoogni-
sable. They are not oharacteristios of empirioal subjects. If this. 
were so, the validity of knowledge would vary aooording to the quali-
ties and oharacteristios of men. Kant distinguishes the subjeot of 
valid knowledge and the empirioal subject that oan itself be an ob-
jeot of soience and possess both true and false beliefs. Kant gives 
a somewhat ambiguous answer to -the question O"f· how the former, trans-. 
cendental, and the empirioal subjeot relate to each other. In my 
view, this is an insoluble aporia, arising from his own assumptions 
about knowledge and experienoe. . 
This is not the only basio problem that Kant's analysis brings 
to the fore. Equally important and insoluble is the question: what 
is the relationship between the objeot of knowl'edge and reality? If 
true knowledge Oan only be established when oertain subjeotive oon-
ditions are fulfilled, this implies that no knowledge of reality in 
itself is possible - Kant talks about Ding an sioh (noumenon). How r 
then, oan we determine whether or not such a reality exists in itself? 
What oan prevent the assumption that what we reoognise as objective 
reality is nothing but a figment of our imagination (oonoeived by the 
Ansohauungsformen and reason)? . , 
Kant presupposes that there is a reality whioh is independent of 
man and not reoognised as suoh by man, and that this reality provides 
~an with material for his peroeptions. This 'matter' is not known; epis-
temologioally it is indeterminate: a 'chaos of peroeptions'. Only inso-
far as it is determined through our modes of peroeption and judgement 
does it beoome an objeot of oognition. Thus, the existenoe and unknow-
ability of reality are reconciled in a purely theoretioal notion of man 
and his relationship to reality. Man is piotured as a being imprisoned 
in the magio· circle of his oognitive power. This oognitive power is 
limited but unohanging and therefore infallible within oertain oons-
traints. Moreover, for indefinable reasons, it provides suffioient 
indioators for man's behaviour vis-a.-vis reality~ 
No positivist will ever aoknowledge or acoept Kant as the .inter-
pretor of his philosophy and oonoeption of man. Neither should I wish 
to oontend that Kant's philoFiophy is valid in all partioulars. This 
does not alter the faot, firstly, that his philosophy throws light 
ona number of problems inherent to the oonoeptionofsoienoe oommonly 
shared by the positivists and Kant; and, seoondly, that in a more 
generalised form, some of the prinoipal theorems of Kant's philosophy 
are also those of the positivists. The differenoes are found in the 
outoomes and not in the points of departure. 
First, there is the assumption that true knowledge is an esta-
hiished ,datum, universal, unqhanging and inter-subjeotive. From this 
it follows that the oognitive subject, as partaking of true knowledge, 
1. Verknupfungsformen des Verstandes. 
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must be unchanging and identical in each individual. The positivist will 
not only refrain as much as possible from making statements about the 
nature of the cognitive subject but, conform to his dislike of such state-
ments, he will also minimise the part played by the subject in the, creation 
of krlowledge. Kant maximised this part to the limits compatible 'with the 
assumption of independent reality. One step further in this direction would 
bring us to a subject which not only moulds the objects of his knowledge, 
but also creates them. The positivist preferably adopts the other extreme, 
nameiy, that of the subject as tabula rasa: a blank and passive receiver 
of impressions of reality, registered in accordance with the frequency of 
their occurrence in objective reality. However, this version does not 
answer the question: how can the s~bject derive general laws (i.e. also 
applicable to non-registered cases) from registered conformities, relative 
frequencies, etc. A great rift exists between these two kinds of knowledge, 
namely, that of observed cases and that of all observable cases with iden-
tical yharacteristics.In order to bridge this gap, the positivist also will 
have to bring in another partic~lar assumption. 
Kant sought for a basis on which to bridge the gap bet.ween the 
particular and the general by assuming uni'form assimilation of the flow 
of perceptions by the subject (by virtue. of the a priori established modes 
of perception and reason). The positivist seeks this basis in'the uniformity 
of nature'i.e. in objective reality. 
The positivist's concept of experience is no less a priori deter-
mined than is that of Kant. The subject, seen through the eyes of the 
positivist, is no less caught in this a priori circle than is the subject 
as conceived by Kant. In fact, as compared to the Kantian subject it is 
doubly confined by that a priori: not only as cognitive but also as active 
subject. 
According to Kant, the validity of 'natural laws' is based on (the 
modes of perception and reason of) the subject and not on objective reality. 
This is also the reality of which the subj ect. forms part as a physi.cally 
active subject. It was to ensure man's freedom in the face of the fact 
of '(natural) science' that Kant lifted the foundation of natural laws 
out of objective'reality and placed it in the human subject. The re-
constructive masterpiece of his Copernican reversal was that he thus 'saved' 
human freedom as well as natural science. 
The positivist rejects such speculative juggling as superfluous, 
misleading and the cause of various pseudoproblems. That by doing so the 
coherence between his own presuppositions eludes him, that his presuppositions 
even beoome lost in obscurity, does not seem to worry him. He puts natural 
laws where they belong -- according to evidence, common sense of meaning? 
-- namely, in nature. He welcomes the fact that in doing so, he reduces man 
to an object of those laws; The problem of human freedom can thus be dismis-
sed as a pseudoproblem and ethical problems reduced to questions of human 
volition which, in turn, is an object of science (psychology). 
The positivist thus seems to avoid metaphysical speculation, remain-
ing as close as possible to 'experience~ However, the granting of the highest 
significance to experience doeS not. eliminate the a priori from that expe-
rience. The, only advantage is that the a priori has no place ( explicitly . 
acknowledg61) in the concept of experience to which man appeals. 
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The distinotion between expe~ienoe and the oonoeption of experienoe 
is-of cardinal importanoe. Everyone has experienoe, without neoessarily 
having any expll0itly worded oonoeption of what it is. However, to appeal 
to experienoe as determinative of the validity or non-validity of know-
ledge does in faot presuppose a, oertain oonoeption of experienoe. The po-
sitivist sees this primarily as sensory peroeption oonoeived aooording to 
a oertain,' basioally meohanistio, view: 'experienoe is the sensory reoep-
tion of impressions or stimuli pr peroeptions from ~utside'whioh thus be-
oome'oontents' of oonsoiousness. 
, From outside' in this sense is extremely ambiguous. Primarily, it is 
a spatial looation: externai to the body. However, 'this does not tally be-
oause the body itself is an objeot of peroeption,by both afferent and 
propriooeptive senses. If we extend the first distinotion, the body itself 
beoomes'external'. The question then is: external with regard to what? The 
central nervous system? But we can feel that nervous system. Even if its 
perceptions are qualitatively different from those of the senses, they are 
nevertheless perceptions. We are thus foroed either to amplify the spatial 
distinction with an entirely different qualitative pne, or to give another 
meaning to the border between'external' and'internal'whioh can then no long-
er be spatial. In its stead, we have the distinotion between spatial reali-
ty and oonsoiousness or, a la Desoartes, between that which has spatial ex-
tension and that which has hone: res extensa and res cogitans. 
However, another method oan be used to show that the spatial element 
in the positivist conoeption of experienoe is not tenable. Even if we oon-
fine ourselves to sensory experienoes related to what is commonly called 
external reality, we are still faoed with the problem that the finished 
product of the experienoe process as oonceived by the positivist: knowledge 
or understanding, is not spatially to be located, let alone located'withi~ 
one or more individuals. Undoubtedly, hearing, sight and smell, and thought, 
desire and feeling for that matter, have 'an anatomical-physiological compQ-
nent and as such a spatial element. ,However, that whioh thus can be observed 
as spatially locatable - and even then only under a series of speoial oondi-
tions - is not hearing, sight or thought, desire or feeling etc., but some-
thing with which they can be correlated in the observation. A oondition that 
must be met if this correlation is to be observed is that not Only must 
someone be available to register these spatially looated processes, but that 
there,be someone able to report that he sees, hears, thinks, wants something. 
There is yet a third way by which it can be demonstrated that the 
positivist conception of experience has an a priori basis. According to po-
sitivism, experienoe is the sensory reoeption of simple sensationsundistor-
ted by interpretation, ooordination or other subjeotive prooesses SO that 
the same external sensation oorresponds eaoh time to the same external sti-
mulus. However, no-one has yet suooeeded in isolating or desoribing suoh 
elementary experienoe units, or in meeting them in his experienoe in any form 
whatsoever. That whioh is aooepted assuoh, in laboratory experiments for in-
stanoe, is aotually as muoh limited by the experimental framework as every 
sensory oomponent is limited by the oontext in whioh it is experienced. The 
pure, elementary experienoe datum is aotually a pure oonstruot, a oonoept 
with whioh nothing in experienoe oorresponds - exoept that whioh man arbi-
trarily deoides to oonsider as such. There need be no objeotion to this if 
it is oonsoiously done within the framework of research. It is olear, how-
ever, that what the researoher deoides is an elementary experienoe datum oan 
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not be given the power ofa touchstone for.the validity of knowledge in ge-
neral. 
The positivist's experience concept is not derived from experience. 
It is a concept that rests on a priori suppositions regarding man and his 
relationship to reality. In fact, this experience concept implies a sharp 
division between cognitive subject and objective reality. 'Complete'. reali-
ty is thought of as two separate spheres, one subjective and the other ob-
jective, which somehow ineet'in'the·human being. The fact of being human, a 
microcosmic reflection of a macrocosmic reality, thus falls into two parts. 
The meeting of these two spheres occurs as an afferent-efferent process of 
understanding and as an efferent-afferent·process of action. Knowledge 
emerges as an exact reproduction of objective reality in the subjective 
consciousness; action is the objective realisation of an inner vo,lition. 
The will oriented towards the external world is attuned to information from 
·that world, but cognition and action are two separate and distinct proces-
ses. Cognition is determined externally whereas action is determined inter-
nally. The cognitive subject is passive and receptive; the other. active and 
productive. That which is determinant of understanding and that which is 
determinant of action can only be thought of as linked via channels running 
outside .the subjective and objective spheres respectively. Facts are facts; . 
arid norms are norms. 
This view runs up against various difficulties, both with regard to 
understanding and with regard to action. Not only is the transition from 
one sphere to the other baffling, but this ~ine of thought does not· clari-
fy the relationships between individual subjects. In the positivist's con-
cept of understanding, inter-subjectivity merges with the inter-changeabi-. 
lity of empirical subjects: individual subjects are identical to each 
other qua cognitive subject (analogous to the way in which Kant explicitly 
formulated this in his doctrine of transcendentalism). Other constructs are 
used with regard to volition and action. Contrary to rationalism which pos-
tulates the identity of reason and reality and therefore of the subject and 
object spheres, positivism springs from an individualist and voluntaristic 
view of humanity. To the positivist, inner aotivity of the will is striotly 
individual; he sees indi viduali ty of the will as man's volitional freedom •. 
The clear separation between the subjeot and objeot spheres must be seen as 
the· (re"":)construotive oonoeptual basis of that individual volitional free-
dom(oompare earlier remarks about Kant's construotive anchorage of the 
will's autonomy). 
In defining man's volitional freedom, positivism oreates gigantio 
problems for the analysis and oonception ~f inter~subjectivityasregards 
volition and aotion. In the pOSitivist-'s view, a basis for the inter-sub-
jectivity of will and action oan be found only in the form of mutual agree-
ment. Individuals oan only cooper~te in an aotivity by entering into agree-
ments with each other. However, this construot founders on the fundamental 
presuppositions of the positivist's image of man and reality. 
In the first plaoe, mutual agreement demands that individuals should 
be able to communicate and to make the substance of their wills known to 
each other. In the framework of the positivist ooncept of man, this would 
mean that one individual must make an'inner fact'outwardly observable to 
another who must recognise it as the expression of the former's will and 
interpret it aooording to the meaning inwardly attaohed to it by the other. 
, 
.1 
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How this is to be done remains shrouded in mystery. To make my standpoint 
clear: I do riot deny the possibility of understanding between individuals .• 
What I contend is that positivism has constructed an image of man and his 
relationship to reality that leaves no room for such communication. 
The second problem on which the positivist runs aground is that mu-
tual agreement must be seen either as a mere fact - in which case it is 
difficult to see how individuals could be bound by it - or as normative 
and binding - in which case: to what does the pre-contractual norm that 
contracts· mus·t be observed owe i tsinter-subjective meaning and . validity? 
The positivist doctrine leaves these matters unt01iched. Even worse, 
any discussion of them is scorned as a product of subjective imagination. 
Yet the intrinsic contradictions in the positivist's conception of man 
still exist. This is not merely a logical imperfection of limited importan-
ce. Positivism in its entirety is made untenable, particularly on those 
points on which it claims to provide a guide and elucidation, i.e. with 
regard to the relationship between subjective lmowledge and objective rea-
lity, and that between knowledge and action. 
Whatever. the cognitive status of a concept of man may be, without 
it man cannot define himself as a human being. It is the ability to commu-
nicate with his fellows that makes man a human being. Every man has a fel-
low. Being human means having a fellow being, that is to say, being able 
to communicate with another. However, this fellow-man who makes us into 
human beings is not presented to us ready-made. Each of us must acquire 
that fellow~man, and with him our humanity, by cOmmunicating with others. 
The quality of being human is a cultural product acquired together with 
other people; a historically variable mode of partnership. 
Languages and symbols are not only means used by man to record his 
inner life and thoughts and to make them outwardly observable (although 
they may fulfil that function); they are much more the methods by which 
man realises himself as a human being together with others, and which he 
subsequently can also use as means to achieve certain goals. Dependent on 
this usage and on the goals which he defines.with the aid of language and 
symbols, he further determines his quality of being human: as a person· 
pursuing a certain objeotive, as a member of a par'ticular community; as a 
man carrying out a particular profession, as an actor in a certain role. 
Being human is self-realisation as a person. 
Not only inter~subjectivity but also human subjectivism is realised 
(in a certain way) during communication. Under Bubjectivity'I understand 
man' S ability to view experience with detachment and to take up a stand 
from which it can be classified (perceived) in various ways. Subjectivity 
means the .abilityto handle things in more than one way, to be able to as-
sociate in various ways, to be able to react in different ways to a parti-
cular situation. For. example, insofar as I am able to use a piece o,f wood 
or stone in different ways, I am a subject; insofar as I am not capable of 
doing so, fbr whatever reason, I am not. Looked at in this way, subjectivi-
ty is not absolute, something which either is or is not but it is some-
thing which is susceptible to both variations and gradations. Human role-
playing is mirrored in the role-playing of things: a thing is not only ex-
perienced, it is experienced as something (as a piece of wood, a branch or 
a stick, a walking stick or a lever, etc.). 
\) 
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Observation is not the passive receipt of impressions, but the ac-
tiveinvolvement of an organism with its environment. That which is obser-
ved is not a meaningless series of impressions, but an egocentric perspec-
tively-structured field from which action possibilities and infeasibilities 
can be derived. It has a certain meaning, a certain quality which is depen-
dent upon the -actions appointed to it (as a thing, as a path, or as a field 
etc.) by the observer. Observations are made discriminately, i.e. according 
to the observer's viewpoint and in view of certain behaviour. 
A human being differs from an animal not only in anatomical and phy-
siological characteristics, but in the variability of his behaviour, parti-
cularly in the ways in which man can attach meanings to the components of 
his field of perception. He has the power to detach himself from that which 
he perceives, to take his distance and subsequently to observe it in various 
ways. This ability is not separate- and disconnected from perception (as 
reason is usually thought to be an independent 'mental'ability which masters 
and moulds the meaningless matter which it perceives). On the contrary, it 
is the ability to observe things in various ways, the ability to perceive 
them as different things and to give them different meanings dependent on 
theco:n,text in which they occur. This context may be a perceived context. 
It may also be a designed and constructed context: one in which perceived 
elem-ents are indirectly related to each other by means of actions after be-
ing detached from the context in_which they were perceived. This detachment 
or abstraction is in itself a mode of observation. That which is observed 
is thereby lifted out of the egocentrically constructed field of perception 
and is given a meaning that is determined independently of that field (as 
is the case with mathematical symbols). 
However abstract the meaning of a symbol may be, it is nevertheless 
an element of perception. It is part of an egocentric perspectively-deter-
mined field of perception; it retains the meaning which it has as such, thus 
enabling us to handle it. [lhis applies to a character, a word, an-equation 
or a:n,ylogical or mathematical operator (whether written- or spoken), no less 
than to a:n,y other element of perception with regard to which we may determi-
_neour actions: they are figures on paper which we can see and write, or 
sounds which we can hear and pronounce. Apart from their significance as 
observed things, they have another meaning that is independent of the con-
text in which they occur, but is determined by their manner of usage in re-
lation to each other. This usage is determined by an action programme exclu-
sively related to the way in which the symbols may be connected to and re-
placed by each other, and which ignores the relationship between the sym-
bols and other elements of perception (whether visual or oral). The meaning 
of the symbols is established independently and therefore is not changed 
during the transition from visual or oral, from written to spoken signs, or 
(and this is more important) from use in one situation to the other,-and 
from one user to the other - as long as the symbols are used according to 
the Tules of the game! An abstract field of possible actions is designed 
simultaneously with the programme of action. 
Between this abstractive extremity and that of concrete egocentric 
perspectively-determined meanings, numerous degrees of disassociation from 
the observed situation and context are possible. A symbol which has been 
completely abstracted from the situation as far as its meaning is concerned, 
is and remains an element of that situation: we are able to work with it. 
But also we can understand it. 
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Each object with which we work has an egocentric perspectively-
determined meaning (informative value): a character,word !'X_J3Y!UP91 no~ess 
than a pen or a glass of water. The manifestation of this object (size, 
shape, colour, contours etc.) vis-a-vis other objects simultaneously and/or 
consecutively observed (such as a plane, a sheet of paper; other sounds or 
shapes, a coat pocket, a table, cupboard, etc.) enables the ,observer to 
work with those objects (to write with the pen, to drink the water, etc.). 
The degree of egocentric determination of what is observed may vary. This 
can 'be illustrated by the following results' of experiments carried 'out among 
people whose perceptive abilities had been disturbed to varying degrees as 
a result of more or less serious brain lesions. Some of these people could 
only perform the act of 'drinking out of a glass'when'a glass filled with, 
liquid was placed in front of them and when they were also thirsty. Others 
could do so when they were not thirsty bpt only when the glass was filled. 
Some could execute the action wit~ an empty glass. Finally, amorma» person 
can demonstrate the action of drinking without holding a glass in his hand. 
This is an example of a series of increasingly abstracted and detachedob-
servations and actions. 
The higher the level of abstraction, the greater the possibility to 
design and execute actions independent of the observed situation •. An arti-
ficial games a~ea,determined not by observed but by decreed relationships, 
is as it were introduced into the· perception field, for example a. "chess-
board and chessmen. What happens in the games area is not completely depen-
dent on the observed relationships but is primarily controlled by the rules 
of the game. The signjficance of the observed relationship is also princi-
pally determined by these rules - although board and pieces naturally retain 
their informative value without which they would be impossible to use. How-
ever, the size, weight etc. of the board and pieces are completely irrele-
vant to the players. It is even possible to play chess by moving people 
distinguished by suitable markings on a lawn that is correctly divided into 
squares. Similarly, the colour or size used to depict a spatial figure with 
which to de.monstrate certain geometric theorems is quite immaterial. The 
essential thing in such cases is.' that the elements of the sign system should 
berlealt with'in relation to each other and in accordance with, set rUles. 
In other words, the significance of these relationships depends exclusively 
upon the rules for the actions that. cause them. The significance of the 
chess position is on the one hand that it was gained from a given starting 
point and according to given rules and, on the other hand, that from it 
other positions can be reached dependent on what the players do under the 
rules'of the game. A position reached because of an earthquake or because 
one player moves out of turn does not belong to the possibilities of this 
game and therefore lacks any meaning. 
As thElIl1ea!1ingo:fsymbols a.:rld actions becomes more abstract, i.e. 
determined less,by observed relations and more by rules, it becomes less 
important by which subject these symbols are observed or used: the players 
become more and more interchangeable. 
It is completely immaterial when, where or by whom a mathematical 
calculation is made or a logical proof is produced. The significance of ei-
ther one is not dependent on the individuals performing it, or on the time 
and place in which it is performed. The. executor might conceivably be a 
'transcendental subject'in Kant's 'sense of the term. 
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The point is that the subjectivity that corresponds to logical and 
mathematical operations is not that of a predetermined subject with certain 
abilities which can only lead to the execution of certain operations. On 
the contrary, it is a conceptually constructed form of subjectivity based 
on logic and mathematics as systems of symbols governed by rules. A form of 
subjectivity, therefore, that can repeateq.ly be constituted by the actions 
of empirical individual sUbjects. The same applies mutatis mutandis to the 
subjectivity of other forms of knowledge. 
Understanding and acting coincide in mathematics and logic. In these 
disciplines it is necessary to be able to work with given symbols according 
to given rules. In other words, to.be able to perform certain operations and 
produce results, knowing that these results are the/outcome of such opera-
tions. This also implies that such knowledge extends no further than the 
I 
actions thus regulated: mathematics and logic'do not relate'to something 
(exept themselves), neither do chess and draughts relate· to'anythingoutside 
'the game. This kind of knowledge is oompletely detached frOm any insight 
or knowledge of reality exept'inasfar as it is determined by the rules ap-
plicable to the symbols (ohessmen, draughtsmen, and the respective board.s). 
In addition to this knowledge, abstracted from egocentric perspecti~ 
vely-determined relationships,· other forms of knowledge exist whose objects 
are observed relationships. These forms of knowledge are also based on the 
ability to work with experienc~ elements. The essential factor is the inter-
subjectivity and the objectivity of these forms and the ways in which they 
are constituted. An indispens~ble factor is the use of symbols, governed by 
rules, and also the introduction of a distinction between symbols and other 
experience elements. The word 'symbol' here he.s a very broad connotation, em-
bracing mathematical symbols as well as words and signals, but also embra-
cing anything used to determine an aspect or characteristic of experience 
elements: e.g. all measuring instruments. 
Signals are a specifickihd' of symbols whose significance is connec-
ted with the egocentrically determined perspective of the situation in which 
they are observed and which consists of indications as to how to act in a, 
given situation. A traffic light indicates how a driver should behave (e.g. 
whether to stop or to drive on);, the umpire's whistle indicate~.; that the ' 
game should begin or should be interrupted; the gong indicates that ,one 
should 'go to dinner, etc. Signals have an intersubjective meaning, not an 
obJective one: they are indicators, but say nothing about what is happening. 
A different matter is that conclusions about the other traffic (play-
ers etc.) may be drawn hic et nunc from such signals. However, this know-
ledge has no more content that the significance of the signal for others. 
The signal does not signify that conduct 'as an object of knowledge, but that 
a certain action needs to be performed by those .to whom it is directed. We 
need only thirik of the no-parking' Signs to realise the difference between 
indicated behaviour and phenomenal object. 
Words may also serve as signals, e.g. 'be ,carefuP, '.stop' 'silence'. They 
may also be used to describe phenomena as objects. They do so not by nature 
or of their own accord any more than they indicate certain actions by nature 
or of their own accord. Both kinds of meaning depend on the rules governing 
the sign usage. Because it is possible to observe experience elements in 
more than one'haturally'determined way and to iift them out of their context, 
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it is possible to ascribe a meaning to them and to use them to signify phe-
nomena as objects. Sounds and figures" thus receive an'additionl1l value', ad-
ditional that is to the informative value they already possess for actions. 
Not only can symbols signify a phenomenon as object; it is also pos-
sib;Le for phenomena observed in different situations and perspectives to be 
classified. With, the aid of words such as'red', horse' etc., 'an observed phe-
nomenon may be turned into an object of knowledge. Moreover, with the aid 
of these words, the phenomena pan be classified as belonging'to different 
'categories. The classification thus introduced is not one that was observed, 
but is a conceptual classification designed by means of symbols. 
Observation forms the basis of meaning. However, meaning is not sole-
ly dependent upon observation. Phenomena may always be classified in various 
ways. Whatever the classification, it is not determined merely by observa-
tions but by a combination of observations and the use of symbols according 
to certain rules., The recognition of phe:rJ.omena as being objectively determi-
ned presupposes their observation as well as the symbolic use of other expe-
rience elements: repeatedly as the same symbols with the same meanings. 
How this is done does not concern us ,here. The point is that people 
do it - that is, they manage it to a certain degree. The crux of the matter 
is that the individuality of the subjects may also be abandoned to'the de-
gree that phenomena are determined by means of symbols ,in an intersubjecti-
vely unequivodlal way. In other words, a general (transcendental) subject of 
knowledge is constituted. 
Knowledge appears in different forms. It is not uniquely determined 
by one or more (innate) abili ti~s of the genus humanum, but by the way in 
which man works with his environment. The simple everyday actions relatiye 
to and concerning,the things around us constitute a form of knowledge. It 
is only on the basis of a clear and systematic division of experience ele-
ments into symboled phenomena that intersubjectively-determined knowledge 
of any objective reality can be obtained. Intersubjectivity, i.e. a certain 
form and degree of interchangeability of individuals, and the objective de-
termination of phenomena are always defined simultaneously and in comple-
mentarity to each other. There is no ready-made cognitive subject that pas-
sively receives impressions, on the one hand, and a ready-made self-deter-
mined objective reality which is som~how reproduced in human consciousness 
on the other. For as far as man has any knowledge at all, he relates acti-, 
vely to his evironment. It is through planned ordering of that relationship 
with the aid of symbols (words, measuring instruments etc.) that man trans-
cends the egocentric d,etermination of observed relationships and his sub-
jective dependency on them. It is this also which makes it possible ,for' man 
to introduce intersubjective as well as objective determination into his 
relationship with his environment. 
Nei ther given cognitive powers of man nor reality "in itself'i deter-
mine where and how the division occurs between symbols and phenomena as 
objects. Neither do they determine which experience eleIl).ents are incorpo-
rated as symbols in ~ction or what elements will be related to them as ob-
jective phenomena. The division is determined partly historically (through 
earlier acquired knowledge) and partly traditionally (through already devel-
oped and current systems of symbols and concepts of man'and his relation 
to reality), and partly through policy based on experience and suppositions 
" 
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regarding the possibilities of acqulrlng new lmowledge. In the latter case, 
value judgements help to decide what should or should not be aspired after 
as knowledge; it is a matter of determinine relative preferences and how 
to allocate scarce resources. This does not mean that the objectEl of our 
lmowled~e are free creations of the human faculty of thought, but rather 
that (1) they are determined only with regard to certain human actions (not 
an sich) and (2) man can still design different ways by which to acquire 
lmowledge. 
The acquisition of lmowledge is a process, an activity, a certain 
way of working with .one's experience milieu. It is a process which is not 
by nature detached from other activities, but one that must be separated 
from them for the sake of intersubjectivity and objective determination. 
The way in which this process of acquiring lmowledge is made autonomous 
is a matter of choice. Man is free in his choice, not in the sense that 
he can act arbitrarily or in the sense that alternatives present themsel-
ves ready-made. He is free in the sense that he can create his own possi-
bilities of choice through his ability to create with the use of symbols 
untried ways of working with the reality of.experience. 

